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Children and Comparative Fault:




Missouri has long favored a system that treats assessment of a child's
contributory fault as a fact issue. This preference was recently reaffirmed by
the Missouri Supreme Court in Lester v. Sayles.2 Although the system,
referred to as the "modem trend,"3 has undeniable advantages and provides
protection for both children and the adults who negligently injure them, the
system has drawbacks when applied to very young children. The negatives
of the system should lead us to question whether society is adequately
protecting its youngsters or demanding far too much of them.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
On June 20, 1988, four-year-old Latonya Lester was struck by a one-ton
truck driven by Mark Sayles.4 The accident occurred at the intersection of
St. Louis Avenue and Elliott Street in St. Louis, Missouri.5 Defendant Sayles
approached the intersection just as Latonya Lester was crossing the street
unattended.6 At trial, Sayles testified that he never saw the child!
The accident left Latonya quadriplegic with extensive brain damage and
led to lawsuits by Latonya and her mother, Wanda Lester.8 Wanda Lester
sought damages from Mr. Sayles and his employer9 for her daughter's
medical expenses as well as for the loss of her services and companionship.
Latonya's claim sought relief for the little girl's own extensive damages."0
1. 850 S.W.2d 858 (Mo. 1993).
2. Id. at 867.
3. Id. at 866.
4. Id. at 861.




9. Id. Mr. Sayles was working for his employer, McHenry Truck Equipment, Inc.
at the time of the accident.
10. Id.
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Latonya and her mother each prevailed in their negligence actions in the
City of St. Louis Circuit Court with jury verdicts of $19,817,000 and
$1,674,000 respectively." The defendants' appeal to the Eastern District
Court of Appeals and the subsequent reversal after transfer to the Missouri
Supreme Court rested largely on an issue that they were not allowed to raise
at the trial level-the comparative negligence of Latonya. At trial, the
defendants sought and were denied last-minute permission to amend their
pleadings to include an allegation of fault on the part of Latonya." In
addition, the trial court refused to instruct the jury on the comparative fault
issue." However, neither of these alleged errors received notable attention
from the Supreme Court.14 Instead, the underlying issue, not raised by the
defendants, of whether comparative fault can even be assessed against such a
young child, formed the crux of the Supreme Court opinion. 5
The Missouri Supreme Court, in an opinion by Judge Limbaugh,
reaffirmed and clarified its earlier holdings on comparative fault by a child of
tender years. The court held that a child's fault is an issue of fact to be
determined according to the standard of care exercised by children of the same
age, judgment, and experience, unless a child is so very young or
inexperiencedthat reasonable minds could not differ on the issue of the child's
capacity for fault.16
Ill. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Missouri first enunciated its policy regarding the contributory negligence
of children around 1900. In four cases with similar fact patterns, 7 the
Missouri Supreme Court announced that the determination of contributory
negligence by a child would not depend on a fixed age limit, 8 but rather
capability of fault was to be a question of fact for the jury."
11. Id. The jury assessed 10% fault to the mother and her award was reduced
accordingly. Prejudgment interest was also awarded.
12. Id. at 865.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 867-69.
15. Id. at 865-67.
16. Id. at 867.
17. Burger v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 20 S.W. 439 (Mo. 1892); Spillane v. Missouri
Pac. Ry., 37 S.W. 198 (Mo. 1896); Holmes v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 88 S.W. 623 (Mo.
1905); Berry v. St. Louis M. & S.E. Ry., 114 S.W. 27 (Mo. 1908).
18. Burger, 20 S.W. at 441.
19. Holmes, 88 S.W. at 626.
1024 [Vol. 59
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In Burger, Spillane, Holmes, and Berry, the court examined the
contributory negligence of children ages four,2" eight, 1and nine,2 and in
each case applied a uniform standard for determination of the issue. Each
case involved a young child who had sustained injuries upon crossing or
playing around railroad tracks. According to the court, "no arbitrary rule can
be established, fixing the age at which a child.. . may be declared wholly
capable or incapable of understanding and avoiding dangers to be encountered
upon railway tracks."'
In conjunction with this belief, the court announced a standard which
declined to set an age limit below which a child would be safe from a finding
of contributory negligence. Instead, the court adopted the view that the
contributory fault of a child is an issue of fact to be determined by a jury,
applying a standard based on "whether the child exercised the ordinary care
and prudence of a child similarly situated."' 4 Characteristics included in the
"similarly situated" standard might be age, judgment, intellectual capacity,
experience, and knowledge."
However, the court allowed one escape from this determination. In the
event a child was exceedingly young and "there is no doubt as to the capacity
of the child," the court could decide as a matter of law that the child was
incapable of contributory negligence.26 To make such a finding was to
adjudge the child non sui juris.'
This standard demanded a fact-specific inquiry into each case, which
typically unearthed acts of carelessness and made the fault determination a
simple decision. For example, in Spillane, a nine-year-old boy, "conversant
with the running of trains" and "living... for years in the immediate vicinity
of [the] crossing," was judged contributorily negligent after he stood beside
the track while attached to a large block of ice on the opposite side of the
20. Berry, 114 S.W. at 28.
21. Holmes, 88 S.W. at 623.
22. Spillane, 37 S.W. at 198; Burger, 20 S.W. at 439.
23. Burger, 20 S.W. at 441.
24. Holmes, 88 S.W. at 625.
25. Id. at 625; Oscar S. Gray, The Standard of Care for Children Revisited, 45
Mo. L. REv. 597, 599 (1980).
26. Holmes, 88 S.W. at 625 (quoting CHARLES F. BEACH, JR., A TREATISE ON
THE LAW OF CONTRIBuTORY NEGLIGENCE § 117 at 167-68 (New York, Baker,
Voorhis & Co. 3d ed. 1899)).
27. Id. at 625. The English translation of "non suijuris" is "not of his own right."
According to Black's Law Dictionary, a personwho is "suijuris" possesses "full social
and civil rights" and is "not under any legal disability.., or guardianship." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 1434 (6th ed. 1991).
1994] 1025
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track via a string tied to his wrist.2" The train struck the string, threw the
boy down, and injured him.29
In accordance with the announced standard, the Spillane court considered
the boy's extensive wisdom and experience in judging his capacity for fault.
The court noted:
When the intelligence of this boy, testified to by his own parents, teachers,
and relatives, is considered along with his experience shown to have been
acquired by living in the immediate vicinity of those tracks, and the glaring,
obvious danger of standing on a railroad track, on which he knew trains
were constantly moving, we can discern no reason why he should not be
held responsible for the recklessness of his conduct."
A similar evaluation occurred, but with a different result, in Burger."
In that case, an "unusually bright," nine-year-old boy attempted to cross
between the cars of a stationary train and was injured when the train started
to move.32 The jury found the young boy was not contributorily negligent
and allowed him to recover-the jury instructions having centered around the
standard of care required of a child similarly situated to him."3 The boy was
shown to be "bright, intelligent, active," to "possess unusual capacity," and to
have "some knowledge of the movement of trains."34 However, the court
carefully noted that while an adult would almost certainly be negligent in that
situation, a child was not to be judged by the adult standard of care." In
support of this contention, the court stated that "[a] boy may have all the
knowledge of an adult . . . but at the same time he may not have the
prudence, thoughtfulness, and discretion to avoid [dangers] which are
possessed by the ordinarily prudent adult person."3
In this newly announced standard, the court anticipated situations in
which a child would be found incapable of negligence as a matter of law.37
The Berry case presented such a situation. In Berry, a four-year-old child was
injured while playing on a railroad turntable.38 The court determined that the
28. Spillane, 37 S.W. at 200-01.
29. Id. at 201.
30. Id.
31. Burger v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 20 S.W. 439 (Mo. 1892).
32. Id. at 440.




37. Supra note 26 and accompanying text.
38. Berry, 114 S.W. at 30.
[Vol. 591026
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issue of the child's contributory negligence could not be raised and recognized
that a child "may be so tender in age and infantile in judgment that the court
as a matter of law might rule he could not be guilty of contributory negligence
in the circumstances of a given case."39 Thus, the court in Berry found the
child non sui juris, but with no explanation of the reasoning behind that
determination."n
In Burger, the court noted that "the rule is believed to be recognized in
all the courts of the country that a child is not negligent if he exercise [sic]
that degree of care which ... would reasonably be expected of one of his
years and capacity."41 However, on that issue the court was mistaken, for a
very different trend was developing in other states.
Although Missouri refused to fix an age below which a child could not
be capable of fault, other states chose to adopt that method. States chose to
set a fixed limit at varying ages, usually ranging from age four to seven.42
One Texas court stated, "This court would be loath to hold in any case that a
child six years old should be denied recovery for injuries caused by the
negligence of an adult defendant."43 In subsequent years, fixed age limits
became more popular with several states, including Colorado,
44 Michigan, 45
and Washington,46 adopting a tender years limit.
47
39. Id. at 29-30.
40. Id. at 30.
41. Burger, 20 S.W. at 441.
42. Galveston Elec. Co. v. Hansen, 7 S.W.2d 934, 936 (Iex. Ct. App. 1928)
(setting the age at six); Temple Lumber Co. v. Lining, 289 S.W. 746, 748 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1926) (setting the age at five).
43. Galveston, 7 S.W.2d at 936.
44. Benallo v. Bare, 427 P.2d 323, 325 (Colo. 1967) (age seven).
45. Baker v. Alt, 132 N.W.2d 614, 620 (Mich. 1965) (age seven).
46. Cox v. Hugo, 329 P.2d 467, 469 (Wash. 1958) (age six).
47. According to Oscar S. Gray, thirty-two states have specified a fixed age limit
or a "conclusive presumption against the capacity for negligence of the very young."
Gray, supra note 25, at 598. However, Gray also recognizes that authorities disagree
as to this number. Gray, supra note 25, at 597. In fact, Gray incorrectly includes
Missouri in his list of tender years states, Gray, supra note 25, at 598 n.7; Lester, 850
S.W.2d at 866.
Included in Gray's list are Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado,
Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas,Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland,
Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New York,
North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Texas,
Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin. Gray, supra note 25, at 598 n.7.
See also generally Donald Paul Duffala, Annotation, Modem Trends as to
Contributory Negligence of Children, 32 A.L.R.4th 36 (1984); Donald Paul Duffala,
Annotation, Modem Trends as to Tort Liability of Child of Tender Years, 27 A.L.R.4th
1994] 1027
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Several states chose age seven as the age below which a child cannot be
negligent.48 Furthermore, many states then adopted a modified version of the
tender years doctrine commonly referred to as the Illinois Rule.49 In addition
to setting the fixed age limit at seven, those states declared that children
between seven and fourteen were presumed incapable of negligence, and those
above fourteen presumed fully capable of negligence.5 ° This trend has its
roots in the common law standard for criminal responsibility of children, and
it also has a biblical basis." In Illinois itself, the rule developed in
piecemeal fashion, with a 1902 case setting age seven as the age below which
a child could not be negligent,52 and a later case establishing the presumption
for children between seven and fourteen.53 The exact number of states
currently following the Illinois rule is unclear.54
Despite clear holdings in Holmes and Spillane, Missouri courts departed
from the modem standard in subsequent cases.5
5
Quirk v. Metropolitan Street Railway,5 6 decided in 1919, involved a seven-
year-old boy who leapt from a moving train after the motorman discovered
him on board.57 The court, though citing the Holmes decision, explicitly
15 (1984).
48. See, e.g., Chicago City Ry. v. Tuohy, 63 N.E. 997, 1003 (111. 1902) (quoting
Chicago City Ry. v. Wilcox, 27 N.E. 899 (111. 1891)). The court said that "up to the
age of seven years a child is incapable of such conduct as will constitute contributory
negligence." Id.
49. See, e.g., Lester, 850 S.W.2d at 865-66. See infra, note 54 and accompanying
text.
50. See, e.g., Maskaliunas v. Chicago & W.I.R.R., 149 N.E. 23, 26 (Ill. 1925).
51. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TE LAW OF TORTS
§ 32, at 180 (5th ed. 1984).
52. Chicago City, 63 N.E. at 1003.
53. Maskaliunas, 149 N.E. at 26.
54. Prosser and Keeton estimate that approxirately twelve states have the fixed
limit at age seven, while "a number" follow the presumption of nonnegligence for
those between seven and fourteen. KEETON ET AL., supra note 51, § 32, at 180.
While there may be others, states following the Illinois rule include: Georgia (Atlanta
Gas Light Co. v. Brown, 94 S.E.2d 612, 615 (Ga. Ct. App. 1956)); Idaho (Owen v.
Burcham, 599 P.2d 1012, 1018 (Idaho 1979)); Illinois (Riley v. Johnson, 424 N.E.2d
842, 846 (iM1. App. Ct. 1981)); North Carolina (Mvitchell v. K.W.D.S., Inc., 216 S.E.2d
408, 412 (S.C. Ct. App. 1975)); Ohio (Howland v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 438 F.2d
725, 729-30 (6th Cir. 1971) (applying Ohio law)); Pennsylvania (Ross v. Vereb, 392
A.2d 1376, 1379 (Pa. 1978)); and West Virginia (Pino v. Szuch, 408 S.E.2d 55, 58-59
(W.Va. 1991)).
55. See supra notes 24, 30 and accompanying text.
56. 210 S.W. 103 (Mo. Ct. App. 1919).
57. Id. at 104.
1028 [Vol. 5 9
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stated that "the tender years of the plaintiff excused him from concurring
negligence."58 In Volz v. City of St. Louis,59 the Missouri Supreme Court
announced a rule that a six-year-old boy could not be guilty of contributory
fault.6" That case involved young brothers who ventured onto thin ice,
despite warnings of the danger, and a failed rescue attempt by the older
brother to save his six-year-old sibling.6 Similarly, the court in Schmidt v.
Allen62 announced, without discussion, that no issue of contributory
negligence was presented because the child involved was only four.63 These
cases and others64 left Missouri law in a state of flux, particularly with regard
to children seven years of age and younger.
In 1983 Missouri negligence law changed drastically with the adoption
of the comparative fault system. Under the new system, a plaintiff partially
at fault would not be completely barred from recovery; instead, the damage
award would be reduced according to his percentage of fault. Missouri courts




The court began its discussion of the comparative negligence of children
by noting that this issue necessarily involves the difficulty of balancing two
somewhat conflicting concerns: that children not be held to the same standard
58. Id. at 105.
59. 32 S.W.2d 72 (Mo. 1930).
60. Id. at 74.
61. Id. at 73.
62. 303 S.W.2d 652 (Mo. 1957).
63. Id. at 658.
64. See, e.g., Price v. Bangert Bros. Road Builders, Inc., 490 S.W.2d 53, 56 (Mo.
1973) (four-year-old could not be contributorily negligent for failing to wear a seat-
belt).
65. After considering it at length, the Missouri Supreme Court adopted the
Uniform Comparative Fault Act in Gustafson v. Benda. The court found the
comparative fault method to be "in the best interest of all litigants" and able to "fulfill
the needs of our complex modem society." 661 S.W.2d 11, 15 (Mo. 1983).
66. Judge Limbaughwrote the opinion inLesterv. Sayles. Before addressing the
allegations of error raised by defendants regarding denial of permission to amend their
pleadings and refusal to permit jury instructions on the issue of comparative fault of
Latonya Lester, the court recognized a needto resolve the underlying issues of whether
Latonya was capable of fault and how the question of her fault was to be determined.
850 S.W.2d at 865.
1994] 1029
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of conduct as adults, and that adults not be required to assume "all liability
created by the avoidable carelessness of children."'67
The court described both the fixed age and "Illinois rule" approaches to
comparative negligence before ultimately announcing its preference for the so-
called "modem trend.""8 After briefly mentioning of the early Missouri cases
which first established the "modem trend" in the state,69 the court hinted of
its concern that subsequent cases had eroded those earlier holdings and applied
a somewhat different standard."0 The court unequivocally declared that the
"modem trend" is the applicable law in Missouri."
The court noted the modem standard commands that a child's
comparative fault be a fact issue determined by the jury." That
determination is to be based upon the degree of care exercised by children
similarly situated-of similar age, judgment, and experience. 3 An exception
is made for children who are exceedingly young or for whom evidence of
incapability is "so overwhelming that reasonable minds could not differ on the
issue . . . ."' In such a situation, the court may rule that the child is
incapable of fault as a matter of law."
According to the court, the modem trend is "more sound" and more likely
to lead to a fair outcome than the fixed age limit or, particularly, the "Illinois
Rule."76 The court acknowledged that establishment of a fixed age might
result in a standard that is easy to apply and produces consistent outcomes, but
condemned the standard as "arbitrary," and having "little basis in reason.""
Criticizing the fixed age standard, the court pointed to the possibility that a
child one day short of the required birthday could be incapable of fault, while
a child one day past the required birthday might be fully capable of
comparative negligence.78 The modem trend, according to the court, "allows
for a degree of flexibility . . . so that a child's negligence or fault is
determined in relation to the expectations held for other children in same or
similar circumstances."79
67. Id.
68. Id. at 865-67.
69. Id. at 866.
70. Id. at 867.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 866.
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V. COMMENT
The Missouri Supreme Court reaffirmed a standard which enjoys
widespread support across the United States. The "modem trend," which
makes a child's fault an issue of fact based on a standard of care for children,
is a logical way to achieve two important goals: avoiding assessment of full
liability to a party involved in an accident caused by a careless child and
protecting children by refusing to hold them to the same level of care as an
adult."0 However, since Missouri now follows the comparative fault theory
of negligence,"1 these goals could be better achieved, as well as protection
and consistency enhanced, with two alterations in Missouri's approach to
childhood negligence.
Adoption of a child's standard of care acknowledges several important
realities: children have the ability to make certain judgments and decisions,
have some experience in safety-related issues, and may possess the same or
even a higher level of knowledge than adults on some subjects. At the same
time, the standard accounts for the fact that children often do not respond
consistently to the same situations, lack experience in many areas, may be
influenced by a child's concerns or misunderstandings, and at times act with
utter disregard for their own well-being. A fixed age system, particularly one
that extends a presumption of incapacity up to age fourteen, simply fails to
account for all of these variations.
Burger,' Holmes' and other early Missouri cases applied the doctrine
of contributory negligence, which was in effect in Missouri until 1983.'
Under that system, the "modem trend" for evaluating child negligence had
definite benefits. Ideally, only a child who truly should have known better
would be denied recovery; and an adult defendant would not bear full liability
for an accident predominantly the fault of a careless child. However, neither
the "modem trend" nor the fixed age method could counteract the unfairness
inherent in the contributory negligence system. Under that system, either
method could be wholly unfair to children, even children who acted as
recklessly as the boy in Spillane.5 Even though a child's foolishness may
80. See id. at 865.
81. Supra note 64 and accompanying text.
82. Burgerv. MissouriPao. Ry., 20 S.W. 439 (Mo. 1892). See supra note 18 and
accompanying text.
83. Holmes v. Missouri Pao. Ry., 88 S.W. 623 (Mo. 1905). See supra note 24
and accompanying text.
84. Gustafsonv. Benda, 661 S.W.2d 11, 15 (Mo. 1983). See also supra note 64
and accompanying text.
85. Spillane v. MissouriPao. Ry., 37 S.W. 198, 201 (Mo. 1896). See supra note
28 and accompanying text.
1994] 1031
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have caused an accident, it seems cruel to completely deny recovery to a child
severely injured if an adult was partly responsible. Adoption of comparative
fault at least partially addressed this problem.
The Lester v. Sayles decision, though not directly announced as such, is
presumably a discourse on how child fault is to be treated now that
contributory negligence is no longer the applicable law. The court decided
unanimously that the "modem trend" should continue under the comparative
fault doctrine. 6 The "modem trend," in combination with the comparative
fault method, protects injured children against complete denial of recovery and
protects adults against assessment of full fault for an accident caused in part
by a child exercising poor judgment. Furthermore, assessing a percentage of
fault seems the ideal way to account for the child's lack of cognitive ability
and maturity. However, one area remains where the "modem trend" fails,
even in combination with the comparative fault system. It denies adequate
protection to one important group-the exceedingly young.
Two alterations in Missouri's law pertaining to child negligence would
result in the most effective balance of protecting very young children and
protecting adults who accidentally injure them from full liability. The first is
to draw a fixed age limit. The second is to abandon the notion that parental
negligence can in no way be imputed to the child.
Courts have recognized that children below age five lack the capacity to
make judgments and decisions with any consistency and should not be
expected to do so. We often see this in the finding of non sui juris, which
declares the child incapable of fault as a matter of law.' Missouri's
"modem trend" allows for this finding, with most of the state's non suijuris
cases involving children under the age of five.' In fact there are apparently
few, if any, Missouri cases in which a child of four or younger was adjudged
comparatively or contributorily negligent.8 9 However, while no one would
accuse state judges of being arbitrary in their application of the rule, the
probability exists that non suijuris findings would vary from judge to judge,
raising the possibility that a five-year-old would be protected in one county
and assessed fault in another.
Although the non suijuris finding offers limited protection to youngsters,
the fixed age limit, with its consistency in application, is a more appropriate
protection. In choosing the fixed age approach, the Ohio Supreme Court
noted, "the conclusive presumption approach... provides a clear and simple
86. Lester, 850 S.W.2d at 867.
87. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
88. Price v. Bangert Bros. Road Builders., Inc., 490 S.W.2d 53, 56 (Mo. 1973);
Schmidt v. Allen, 303 S.W.2d 652, 658 (Mo. 1957); Volz v. City of St. Louis, 32
S.W.2d 72, 74 (Mo. 1930).
89. Gray, supra note 25, at 612.
[Vol. 591032
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rule which we believe will reach just and accurate results while also achieving
a desirable judicial economy."9 Even Prosser, cited by the court in Lester
as an advocate of the "modem trend,"9 acknowledged the incapacity of the
young when he stated, "As the age decreases, there are fewer possibilities of
negligence, until finally, at some indeterminate point, there are none at all."
In his opinion that age would be "somewhere in the neighborhood of four
years of age."' If courts are willing to acknowledge this incapacity in the
exceedingly young, the next logical step is to simply draw a line below which
no child can be found at fault.
A logical argument against line drawing is it might result in an
exceedingly bright child of early years being unjustifiably relieved of fault.
However, a bright-line rule merely recognizes that children below a certain
age, regardless of their level of intelligence, lack the maturity to make good
judgments. In fact, refusing to apply a fixed age penalizes those exceedingly
bright children by forcing upon them an expectation that maturity must
accompany their knowledge. For society to demand such responsibility from
its children is unfair and unwise. A fixed age is the best way to assure needed
protection to children below a certain age and, through uniform application,
to demonstrate that the protections of the system will be available to all
youngsters.
The Missouri Supreme Court criticized the fixed age standard as
"arbitrary" and voiced concern that one day's difference in age could be the
determining factor in capacity for fault.93 This was a valid concern under a
system of contributory negligence, as a situation could have arisen in which
a child one day short of the designated birthday was protected by the fixed
rule, while a child one day past that birthday was assessed fault. Under the
comparative fault system, the result is not altogether as harsh as the court
posits, and the mere fact that the situation could occur does not obviate the
need for line drawing. After all, the likely outcome under comparative fault
is that while the younger child is still incapable of negligence, the child just
beyond the line will be assessed only a small percentage of fault, if any, due
to his young age. Some would argue that this is the precise reason why no
age need be fixed. Conversely, this author submits that the comparative fault
system would operate most effectively if combined with an age limit that
protects very young children and provide a much needed starting point for the
jury.
90. Holbrook v. Hamilton Distrib., Inc., 228 N.E.2d 628, 630 (Ohio 1967).
91. Lester, 850 S.W.2d at 866.
92. WiLLrmM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 32 at 159 (3d
ed. 1964).
93. Lester, 850 S.W.2d at 867.
1994] 1033
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One significant benefit of a fixed age limit involves the role of the trier
of fact. This idea was emphasized in a West Virginia case where the court,
in discussing the child's standard of care, said simply, "We find the . . .
standard too vague to assist a jury."" While it may not be unreasonable to
ask a jury to assess the negligence of a twelve-year-old based on a child's
standard of care, it is quite a different task to require the same analysis with
respect to a three-year-old. With older children there may be recognizable
levels of expectation regarding certain tasks or decisions, but the same is not
true for the exceedingly young.
The Holmes court recognized that the "main question" involved in child
negligence cases is whether the child is "of sufficient maturity to be held
accountable for his imprudent act... .,, This author submits that children
who are extremely young do not possess the maturity to be held accountable
for any act of negligence. More important than whether the child possesses
certain knowledge is the reality that toddlers are not mature enough to
consistently apply that knowledge in every situation. Since the behavior of
very young children is inherently unpredictable, how can we expect a jury to
predict what a "similarly situated" young child would do? In other words,
there is no ascertainable standard of care for the exceedingly young, and to
ask a jury to create such a standard is demanding too much. A fixed age limit
would benefit this class of very young children and ease the burden on the
jury.
Setting a fixed age limit merely recognizes the point in time when courts
can confidently begin evaluating capacity. Society engages in such line
drawing in many areas, including drinking, age of consent, capacity to
contract, and juvenile court jurisdiction. In the negligence context, the line
provides the jury with a starting point at which society begins to expe.ct some
degree of responsibility, and at which evaluations of negligence can begin to
occur. Children slightly past the age limit are likely to receive more
protection under this system than under the "modem trend" because jurors are
almost certain to recognize the child's close proximity to the age designation
and limit their consideration accordingly.
Perhaps the most persuasive argument against the fixed age limit is the
possibility that an innocent adult defendant will have to provide full
compensation to the injured child. But the fixed age system need not work
a hardship on parties sued for negligence in accidents involving children,
providing another necessary change evolves in Missouri case law.
In most accidents involving adults and very young children, another party
could appropriately be assessed with fault-the child's parent or guardian.
Though parents arguably cannot constantly supervise their older children and
94. Pino v. Szuch, 408 S.E.2d 55, 58 (W.Va. 1991).
95. Holmes, 88 S.W. at 624. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
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typically give them more freedom to act for themselves as they mature,
children under five should not, and generally are not, free to go about their
business. Thus, when a very young child is injured, frequently a lack of
supervision issue exists.
Several cases have acknowledged the role of parental fault, including
Lester v. Sayles,96 and have even reduced the parent's recovery by the
parents percentage of fault." However, when the child is the plaintiff, courts
refuse to consider parental fault because of the Missouri rule that the parents
fault cannot be imputed to the child.9" That rule, appropriate under the old
contributory negligence system, should be abandoned under the modem
comparative fault system.
Under the contributory negligence system, imputing the parent's fault to
the child produced the grossly unfair result of completely denying recovery
to the child. However, the situation is somewhat different under the
comparative fault system. Due to the percentage fault values assigned to the
responsible parties, a possibility exists that a child might be found 50%
responsible in his own cause of action, and the parent 80% responsible in his
cause of action for the child's injuries. That adds up to 130% of fault
between the parent and the child, and a defendant who is unfairly forced to
compensate both parties. However, Missouri courts have set the stage to
correct this anomaly.
Under the contributory negligence system, Missouri courts held that a
parent whose own negligence was a contributing cause could not sue for the
wrongful death of a child.99 However, if both parents were to join in a claim
for wrongful death, the negligence of one of them would not bar the
claim.10 The Missouri Court of Appeals recently applied this concept in the
context of comparative fault. The court in Teeter v. Missouri Highway &
Transportation Commission announced that parents can still join in a claim
despite the negligence of one parent.10  However, once judgment is
rendered, the negligent parent's share is to be reduced by that parent's
percentage of fault."°
96. Lester, 850 S.W.2d at 862.
97. Id. See also Wilsonv. Lockwood, 711 S.W.2d 545, 555 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986)
(allowing a ten percent reduction in damages due to the parent's comparative
negligence).
98. Schmidt, 303 S.W.2d at 658.
99. State ex rel. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. v. Pinnell, 605 S.W.2d 537, 538
(Mo. Ct. App. 1980).
100. Reynolds v. Thompson, 215 S.W.2d 452, 454-55 (Mo. 1948).
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Following the teachings of Teeter, the logical procedure in a case
involving child negligence is to merge the claims of the parent and the young
child. This allows for a more accurate percentage fault distribution.
Furthermore, in those cases where the child is too young to be assessed any
fault, it places blame on the appropriately responsible person-the parent.
Once a judgment is rendered, the parent's share of the recovery can be
reduced by the parent's percentage of fault, and the child's share of the
recovery can be reduced by the amount of the child's fault, if any.
VI. CONCLUSION
Missouri's approach to the issue of a child's comparative negligence is
a sound and reasonable one. It offers protection to both the adults charged
with negligence and the children whose careless acts are involved. However,
a significant flaw in the Missouri rule is the lack of complete protection for
those children who are too young and immature to be held accountable for
their actions. An alteration in the Missouri rule, fixing an age of four or five
as the litie below which no child could be comparatively negligent, would
provide the consistent protection not offered by the non suijuris finding. This
change, combined with the consideration of parents' fault in a child's
negligence action, assures a more logical result without a corresponding
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